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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jesus Manuel Garcia appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Order
of Commitment. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State
to present irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence including two photographs of the alleged
victim, Mr. Ruiz Gomez, and the testimony of Mr. Ruiz Gomez' wife, Danielle Nylander, that he
was a good person, for the purposes of proving his "humanness."
Additionally, Mr. Garcia asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which
deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see that Mr. Garcia had a fair
trial by appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury. Mr. Garcia contends that
the misconduct committed in his case is not harmless.
Furthermore, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
him to excessive sentences without giving proper weight and consideration to the mitigating
factors in his case.
Finally, he asserts the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$162,185.27 in restitution because it failed to give proper weight to his inability to pay and his
limited future earing ability.
This Reply brief is necessary to address the State's assertions to the contrary.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Mr. Garcia's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated m this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting two photographs of Daviel Ruiz
Gomez and allowing his wife, Danielle Nylander, to testify about her opinion of Mr. Ruiz
Gomez' personality and character?

II.

Did the State violate Mr. Garcia's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

III.

Do the errors in Mr. Garcia's case amount to cumulative error?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Garcia, a unified
sentence of life, with twenty-five years fixed, for his conviction for second degree
murder, twenty years, with six years fixed, for his aggravated battery conviction, and
three years fixed, for his possession of a controlled substance conviction?

V.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Garcia to pay $162,185.27
in restitution?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Two Photographs Of Daviel Ruiz Gomez
And Allowing His Wife, Danielle Nylander, To Testify About Her Opinion Of Mr. Ruiz Gomez'
Personality And Character
Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to
present State's Exhibits 1 and 2 and the relevant portions of Ms. Nylander's testimony for the
purpose of showing that the alleged victim, Mr. Ruiz Gomez, was a human being. Further,
assuming arguendo that this Court finds the evidence to be relevant, Mr. Garcia asserts the
evidence is overly prejudicial.

A.

State's Exhibits 1 And 2
1.

Relevancy Of State's Exhibits 1 And 2

The State has asserted that the "in life" photos of Mr. Ruiz Gomez were relevant to
"identify Gomez in the low-quality security footage" and "to determine that Gomez was a
human." (Resp. Br., pp.8-13.) However, during the admissibility hearing, the State argued that
the photos were necessary or admissible for humanization purposes and to show that Mr. Ruiz
Gomez did not look like a "gangster" or "pretty [expletive] hard guy[]." (Tr. 4/2/18, p.95, L.14p.96, L.21.) Only these two theories were presented, despite an invitation from defense counsel
to argue that the prosecution was seeking admission of the photos for identity purposes.
(Tr. 4/2/18, p.94, Ls.15-19.) Idaho appellate courts no longer accept unpreserved theories from
either party. See State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217 (2019); State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho
271 (2017), State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717 (2017); State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585 (2018). As
such, the State cannot now argue, for the first time on appeal, that the photos were necessary to
assist the jury in identifying Mr. Ruiz Gomez in the security footage.
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On appeal, the State has also abandoned the theory that State's Exhibits 1 and 2 were
admissible to disprove a self-defense related claim that the alleged victims looked hard or like
gangsters. (Resp. Br., pp.8-17.) The State's failure to present augment or authority on this
potential ground for admission amounts to a waiver of that issue. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho
159, 168 (2014).
Accordingly, the only properly presented ground for admission of State's Exhibits 1 and
2 is that the photos provided for the humanization of the deceased. Mr. Garcia maintains that
these photographs were wholly unnecessary to prove Mr. Ruiz Garcia was a human being, did
not actually provide any biological evidence proving that he was a human being, and, to the
extent they have any probative value, it was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

2.

State's Exhibits 1 And 2 Were Not Admissible Because They Are More
Prejudicial Than Probative

The State has asserted that Mr. Garcia "waived his Rule 403 objection to the 'in life'
photographs" because he did not present argument about the prejudicial nature of the evidence.
(Resp. Br., p.11.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Garcia did present argument that State's
Exhibits 1 and 2 were unfairly prejudicial.

(App. Br., pp.10-12.) Mr. Garcia asserted that

allowing "evidence of humanness," including the photos admitted specifically for that purpose,
invited jurors to consider the "value or quality of the victim" in determining a defendant's guilt.
(App. Br., p.10.) He also presented argument that the "challenged evidence," meaning both the
exhibits and testimony, was "unfairly prejudicial" because this was not just a case of the jury
determining whether or not a stabbing occurred, but if the actions of Mr. Garcia were in selfdefense.

(App. Br., p.11.)

Both State's Exhibits 1 and 2 and Ms. Nylander's testimony

presented the same type of bolstering evidence and, as such, the challenged evidence as
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prejudicial in the same ways. Both the testimony and photos portrayed Mr. Ruiz Gomez a
likeable person. Additionally, State's Exhibit 2 showed that Mr. Ruiz Gomez participated in a
FitOne 5K.

(State's Exhibit 2.)

This photo shows that he was both fitness minded and

community minded, as the FitOne race is a community event and fundraiser for St. Luke's
Children's Hospital.

FitOne, https ://www. fitonebo ise. org/frequently-asked-questions (last

visited on August 29, 2019). Further, section I(C)(2) of the Appellant's Brief was not only titled,
"Assuming Arguendo That Exhibits And Testimonial Evidence Was Relevant, The Evidence
Was Not Admissible Because It Was More Prejudicial Than Probative," but the conclusion also
specifically referenced both the challenged exhibits and testimony. (App. Br., pp.11-12.) Thus,
Mr. Garcia presented argument as to the prejudicial nature of both the exhibits and testimony.
In an additional argument, the State reasserted that the photos assisted the jury m
"identifying Gomez in the China Blue security video." (Resp. Br., p.12.) The State also relied
on State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 610 (Md. 1996), for the proposition that "in life" photographs
are not unfairly prejudicial because they are not more prejudicial than autopsy photos. 1 (Resp.
Br., p.12.) However, Broberg specifically deals with photographs presented for the purposes of
establishing identity. 677 A.2d at 605-12. As noted previously, the State is precluded from
making any arguments about admissibly for identity purposes, as identity was not presented as a
ground for admission of the photos. See generally Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217.
Finally, the State argues that State's Exhibits 1 and 2 were not prejudicial because the
Court has previously determined that graphic autopsy photos were not overly prejudicial. (Resp.
Br., p.12.) This argument is misplaced. Autopsy photographs serve a different purpose than the
"in life" photographs.

In fact, six autopsy photographs were admitted in the case at hand.
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(State's Exhibits 138-143.) Defense counsel did not object to their admission. (Tr., p.1453,
Ls.14-20.) Presumably, this was because counsel recognized the probative value of the exhibits.
However, State's Exhibits 1 and 2, have very little, if any, probative value. As such, unlike
autopsy photos, the threshold for finding that the probative value is outweighed is much lower.
The prejudicial nature of the photographs is due, at least in part, to their underlying
inferences: Mr. Ruiz Gomez was young, handsome, looked happy on his wedding day, lived a
happy life with his wife, the two enjoyed doing things together, he helped charities, he a great
guy, and was a man with value to society. These inferences were exploited by Ms. Nylander's
testimony-"[Daviel] was the most amazing person you'll ever meet in your life". (Tr., p.329,
Ls.14-15.)

When combined together, these inferences, representing the prejudicial impact,

overshadow and outweigh any possible probative value. It is hard to imagine a juror looking at
the photos of Mr. Ruiz Gomez and not thinking, "What a shame that such an 'amazing' young
man had to die." But, instead thinking merely, "That looks like a human being."
Hence, the contested evidence was unfairly prejudicial and likely contributed to the jury's
determination of whether Mr. Ruiz Garcia and/or Mr. Rosales could have been the initial
aggressors and whether Mr. Garcia's actions could be justified as self-defense.

3.

The State Failed To Prove That The Admission Of The Exhibits Was Harmless

The State has asserted that the admission of State's Exhibits 1 and 2 are harmless because
the "photographs lacked any prejudicial effect and the jury heard overwhelming evidence of
guilt." Both of these arguments are erroneous.

1

The Respondent's Brief cites "Broberg. 677 A.2d at 561."
typographical error. The page should be listed as 610.
6

This citation contains a

a.

The Contested Evidence Was Prejudicial

Mr. Garcia maintains that State's Exhibit's 1 and 2 were unfairly prejudicial.

His

arguments in support of this assertion can be found in section I(A)(2) and are incorporated herein
by reference. Additionally, the State has cited to several cases and asserted that these cases hold
that the photographs could not have contributed to the verdict because they lacked prejudicial
effect. (Resp. Br., p.13.) However, not a single case cited by the State dealt with a case where a
defendant was asserting self-defense. See Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 623 (1986); State v.
Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 658 (Tenn. 2013);
Broberg, 677 A.2d at 608; State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 646 (N.C. 1995); People v. Taylor,

801 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Cal. 1990). Therefore, these cases provide little guidance, as Mr. Garcia's
self-defense claim is at the heart of the unfair prejudice created by the photographs.

b.

The Standard For Proving An Error Is Not Overwhelming Evidence Of
Guilt

The State has asserted that the test for determining harmlessness is "overwhelming
evidence" of guilt.

(Resp. Br., pp.13-17.) However, this is not the correct standard.

The

harmless error doctrine has been defined by the Idaho Supreme Court: "To hold an error as
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a
violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227 (2010).
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Mr. Garcia acknowledges that a fairly recent case from the Idaho Supreme Court did
contain a reference to the incorrect "overwhelming evidence" standard. State v. Montgomery,
163 Idaho 40, 46 (2017). However, this case appears to be an outlier and did not specifically
overrule the standard articulated in Perry. In fact, the proper Perry standard has since been
affirmed and rearticulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868
(2019).
It is not surprising that the Perry Court adopted Chapman's articulation, nor that the

Chapman standard was reaffirmed in Jeske, as the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the

propriety of that articulation in Sullivan:

the proper inquiry "is not whether, in a trial that

occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).

The Chapman articulation does not provide for an

appellate court's determination of how a reasonable jury would have acted without the erroneous
evidence because "the question [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what
effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but
rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand." Id.
The "overwhelming evidence" articulation, on the other hand, expressly invites the
appellate court to engage in that sort of analysis Sullivan declared to be improper. By saying the
weight of the other, untainted evidence is "overwhelming," the appellate court is saying that,
based on its own weighing of the evidence, a reasonable jury would be expected to render a
guilty verdict based on the evidence without the error.

Conducting that sort of analysis is

particularly disconcerting because the jury is far better equipped to weigh the evidence than the
appellate court is. See, e.g., State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 366 (1984) (in regard to a challenge
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to the sufficiency of the evidence, "[ o ]ur function on appeal is to examme the supporting
evidence, not place ourselves in the jury's position or reweigh the significance of evidence as it
relates to specific elements."); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 748 (1975) ("The credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters for the jury, not the court," and
so, the district court committed "serious error" by dismissing charges based only the court's
weighing of the testimony); cf Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 749 n.1 (2012)
("'The trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of
witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence. Appellate review is necessarily more
limited. While we must review the evidence, we are not in a position to 'weigh' it as the trial
court can."') (quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 770 (1986)); State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho
121, 128 (2010) (applying the same rationale in a criminal case in regard to a decision on a
motion to suppress). Because the jury is in the best position to weigh the evidence, it, and not
the appellate courts, should be the one to actually conduct that weighing. See Sullivan, 508
U.S. at 279-80.
Essentially, the Court of Appeals' approach transforms the harmless error analysis into a
review for the sufficiency of the evidence, and in so doing, ignores the impact of the error on the
jury that actually judged the defendant's guilt or innocence. This, as made clear by the Sullivan
Court, is unacceptable under the United States Constitution. Even the appellate court's best
efforts to weigh the evidence properly will not be sufficient to satisfy the protections provided by
the Sixth Amendment: "The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a
hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal;
it [the Sixth Amendment] requires an actual jury finding of guilty." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280.
In other words, "to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter how
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inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial
guarantee." Id. at 279 ( emphasis added). As such, the State's argument that any potential error
in admitting the photographs is harmless due to the "overwhelming evidence" of guilt is
erroneous and insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that the contested evidence contributed to Mr. Garcia's conviction.
For the sake of argument, Mr. Garcia asserts that there was not overwhelming evidence
of his guilt. Certainly, he has admitted that he was involved in the fight at China Blue and that
he caused the injuries to Mr. Ruiz Gomez and Mr. Rosales; however, he was adamant that his
actions were in self-defense. (Tr., p.1625, L.14 -p.1633, L.25.) In fact, there was evidence to
support Mr. Garcia's asserted defense because self-defense instructions were provided to the
jury. (R., pp.558-561.) "A defendant is entitled to have the jury instruction on his theory of the
case whenever there is some supportive evidence for that theory." State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho
323, 329 (Ct. App. 2009).
Regardless of testimony about Mr. Garcia's actions earlier in the evening, eye witness
accounts, and his differing statements to police, there is only one critical piece of evidence in this
case-the video of the fight in China Blue. In all of its detailed discussion about the evidence
presented at trial, the State never mentions the video of the fight. (Resp. Br., pp.14-17.) Even if,
for the sake of argument, Mr. Garcia did everything the State asserted prior to the fight, the
parties had separated and gone about their evening; then the alleged victims initiated contact with
Mr. Garcia. (Tr., p.938, L.2-p.943, L.22, p.1624, L.1-p.1625, L.21.) The video clearly shows
the alleged victims initiate contact and start the physical altercation with Mr. Garcia. 2 (Defense

2

The State also asserted that Mr. Garcia's use of a knife in a bar fight was unreasonable.
Unfortunately, it is all too common for bar fights to involve weapons including knives and guns.
A simple search of the headlines on any given day will illustrate this point. Although a fact for
10

Exhibit A.) The video alone is enough to prove that there was not overwhelming evidence of
guilt.
As such, Mr. Garcia asserts the State failed prove that the admission of State's Exhibits 1
and 2 was harmless error.

B.

Ms. Nylander's Testimony
The State has asserted that "[a]ll ofNylander's answers about Gomez were relevant with

one exception," Mr. Garcia ''waived any Rule 403 objection ... by failing to object to her
testimony on that basis," the evidence was not overly prejudicial, and any error in admitting the
evidence was harmless due to "overwhelming evidence of guilt." (Resp. Br., pp.18-29.) Each of
the State's arguments fail.

1.

The Contested Portions Of Ms. Nylander's Testimony Were Not Relevant

Ms. Nylander's contested answers were not relevant.

The State has conceded that

Ms. Nylander's testimony regarding her and Mr. Ruiz Gomez trying for children was not
relevant. (Resp. Br., pp.19.) Mr. Garcia maintains that other portions of her testimony were also
irrelevant. Specifically, he asserts that her testimony that "[Daviel] was the most amazing person
you'll ever meet in your life"; he was "very kind"; always willing to help people; "was very,
very hard working"; worked 60 hours a week; "took care of [Ms. Nylander] like no one ever
did"; enjoyed going on hikes and to the gym; and was involved in the community was all
irrelevant testimony that was erroneously admitted.

the jury to determine, Mr. Garcia asserts that it is not per se unreasonable to defend one's self
with a knife, when being attacked by multiple people in a bar.
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The State cited several cases that stand for the proposition that some limited general
background evidence is appropriately admitted. (Resp. Br., pp.19-22.) However, these cases do
not support the admission of the type of character testimony that Ms. Nylander was allowed to
present over objection.

Instead, these cases endorse the admission of limited background

evidence, innocuous biographical information, and common contextual evidence. See Roper v.
State, 375 S.E.2d 600, 604-05 (Ga. 1989) (holding that "[t]he identity and general background of

the victim are relevant issues in a murder trial."); State v. Broughton, 450 N.W.2d 874, 876
(Iowa 1990) ("we do not accept the State's argument that [testimony from the victim's family]
should be received as a matter of course in order to 'humanize' the murder victim, [but] we
cannot fmd sufficient prejudice in the rather innocuous biographical information"); Libby v.
State, 859 P.2d 1050, 1057 (Nev. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1037 (1996) (holding

that general background information and evidence related to how the murder was perpetrated are
admissible); State v. Davenport, No. A-94-009, 1994 WL 642698, at *8-9 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov.
15, 1994) (unpublished) (brief and superficial evidence regarding the victim's business and
family was merely a "limited and discreet personification of the victim" and does not inflame the
passions and emotions of the jury); McQueen v. Com., 669 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. 1984)
(testimony of the age of the victim, date of her death, information about the college she attended,
and about her work to make money to complete her master's degree merely showed that the
victim was not a statistic or "nameless void left somewhere on the face of the community," but a
living person); Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 652 (Miss. 2009) (it was proper for the victim's
husband to testify that he was married to the victim for eight years, they had two children
together, where victim worked, and the type of work she did, because the testimony was
background information that set the stage for relevant evidence and did not touch upon the
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victim's character) (Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (testimony
that the witness had been married to the victim for twenty-five years, that they had five children,
and that victim was home alone at the time of murder was properly presented evidence because it
did not cross into inadmissible character evidence proving that the victim was "peaceable and
inoffensive"); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 840--41 (1991)

(Souter, J., concurring)

(common contextual evidence is properly admitted to help jurors "make sense of the narrowly
material facts of the crime itself'); Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 823 (Ky. 2015)
(evidence that the victim was a living person is admissible as "some amount of background
evidence may be relevant to understanding the nature of the crime committed"); Bussell v.
Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994) (no error in guilt phase when a relative merely

calls attention to the fact that the victim was once a living person rather than a statistic).
Mr. Garcia did not object to Ms. Nylander's testimony regarding limited background,
innocuous biographical, or crime related contextual information. (Tr., p.326, L.7 - p.364, L.21.)
Ms. Nylander was able to testify about Mr. Ruiz Gomez' nickname, age, marital status,
employment, living situation, and family makeup without any objection.

(Tr., p.326, L. 7 -

p.331, L.10.) It was only when her answers veered into Mr. Ruiz Gomez' character-"He was
the most amazing person you'll ever meet in your life"; "very kind"; always willing to help
people; "very, very hard working"; "took care of me like no one ever did" and was involved in
the community-or victim impact information-"we were trying [to have children]"-that
counsel objected.

(Tr., p.326, L.7 - p.335, L.13.)

This testimony was not "relevant to

understand the nature of the crime," was "largely irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence,"
and acted to glorify and enlarge the victim. Richmond v. Commonwealth, 534 S. W.3d 228, 233
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(Ky. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). As such, Mr. Garcia asserts that, contrary
to the State's assertion, the contested testimony was not admissible as background evidence. 3
Additionally, the State has asserted that testimony regarding Mr. Ruiz Gomez' physical
fitness was relevant to the fight that occurred. 4 (Resp. Br., pp.22-23.) This is also erroneous.
Evidence that a person hikes, runs a 5K, and goes to the gym does not expressly relate to their
physical abilities in a fight. Relevant testimony may have been that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was trained
in martial arts, was a mixed martial arts fighter, boxer, or wrestler-evidence that was not
presented. Engaging in rather mundane fitness related activities is too dissimilar from the events
at issue to be relevant to Mr. Garcia's self-defense claim.
The State then asserted that evidence that Mr. Ruiz Garcia was "very kind," "always
willing to help people," "took care of [Ms. Nylander] like no one ever did" and other related
evidence was relevant to show that he was not the initial aggressor. (Resp. Br., p.23-42.) Again,
this argument is misplaced. While Rule 404(a) evidence may be offered by the prosecutor to
show "the alleged victim's trait of peacefulness," a defendant's assertions that the alleged victim
was the initial aggressor does not open the door to all character or victim impact evidence.
I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(c). Being kind, helping others, and taking care of one's wife is not evidence "of

3

Mr. Garcia maintains that if this Court determines that this type of "humanness" evidence is
allowed, courts must also allow the presentation of less than favorable "humanness" evidence as
well. This will create a mini-trial on the character of the victim and allow the jury to gage the
value of the deceased and not merely the crime charged. Concerns about whether a defendant
murdered a "saint," the most vicious mob boss, or someone in-between, should not be a trial
concern.
4
The State relies on State v. Malec, No. 42508, 2016 WL 3620715 (Idaho Ct. App. June 29,
2016) in support of its argument. (Resp. Br., p.22.) However, this case is unpublished and
cannot be cited as authority. Idaho Supreme Court Internal Rule 15(t). Regardless, Malec does
not support the admission of the type of fitness testimony provided in the case at hand, but dealt
with evidence showing that a victim was a mixed martial arts fighter. See generally Malec, 2016
WL 3620715.
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the alleged victim's trait of peacefulness." I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(c). Relevant questions may have
been does Mr. Ruiz Garcia have a reputation for being aggressive, for fighting, for
combativeness, or, alternatively, for being passive, walking away from confrontation, for
advocating nonviolence-questions not asked by the prosecution.

Simply, the contested

evidence was not evidence of a trait for peacefulness, but of Mr. Ruiz Gomez' character or
character traits generally. This evidence is not relevant because it does not have "any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and because it does not fall
under the very limited exception ofl.R.E. 404(a)(2)(c). 5 I.R.E. 401.
Lastly, the State appears to argue that Ms. Nylander's testimony that Mr. Ruiz Gomez
was "was the most amazing person you'll ever meet in your life" was also admissible "because it
had at least some tendency to make it less probable that Gomez started a fight with a stranger."
(Resp. Br., p.24.) Again, Ms. Nylander's glowing impression of her husband offers no insight
into Mr. Ruiz Gomez' "trait of peacefulness." I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(c). None of the definitions of
"amazing" offered by the State, "causing astonishment, great wonder, [] surprise," "impressive,"
or "exceedingly good," are words that imply "peacefulness." In reality, some might say that
some the world's most famous boxers are "amazing" in their abilities to win a fight.

For

example, Mike Tyson was an "amazing" boxer, but certainly not known for his character for
peacefulness. This evidence was merely additional, inadmissible character evidence that was not
relevant and does not fall under the I.R.E. 404( a)(2)( c) exception.

5

Mr. Garcia does not specifically assert that the evidence was inadmissible as a violation of
I.R.E. 404(a)(2) as counsel did not object on that basis, but addresses the State's assertions that
this evidence is admissible for this alternate reason. He asserts that I.R.E. 404(a)(2) simply does
not apply to contested evidence.
15

2.

Mr. Garcia Objected To The Testimony Under Both I.R.E. 401 And 403

The State has asserted that Mr. Garcia's I.R.E. 403 prejudice argument was not preserved
by objection. (Resp., Br., pp.24-26.) However, a review of the relevant portions of the transcript
shows that I.R.E. 403 prejudice challenge was preserved. The first objection to Ms. Nylander's
testimony was made a bench conference and the contents are not immediately disclosed by the
transcript. (Tr., p.329, Ls.16-18.) The next objection merely stated, "Judge at this point I'd
renew the objection I just made." (Tr., p.330, Ls.4-5.) Moments later, "Your Honor, I would
resume my objection. I don't see the relevance." (Tr., p.331, Ls.16-17.) Shortly thereafter,
counsel renewed the objection to the admission of State's Exhibits 1 and 2, the subject of a pretrial litigation. (Tr., p.332, Ls.19-24.) Then making one final attempt to limit the improper
testimony, counsel again objected stating, "Objection, Your Honor, relevance." (Tr., p.334,
L.22.) While it is true that, during Mr. Nylander's testimony, counsel did not utter the words
"prejudice" or "I.R.E. 403" on the record, later statements prove the contents of counsel's bench
conference objection and the purpose of the continuing objections.

After Ms. Nylander's

testimony, the parties were provided an opportunity to discuss the evidence while the jury was
excused:
MR. MARX: Your Honor, I think - if the State limits the testimony to the
perceptions of Daviel while they were out drinking and out partying, I think that
that falls within the reason of where it would be. The constant questions about
how he was like as a person, how he was as husband in this case or a brother or a
friend, it's simply to bolster who he is. I think it goes to part of our argument
related to those pictures that we had at the prior hearing where the State is
attempting to build up the deceased as a fantastic person who was snatched from
his family and friends and really trying to inflame the passions of the jury against
Mr. Garcia. I just don't see that it's relevant.
I think that it certainly becomes cumulative if it's continuing to do so.

There's a difference between talking about what he was like on the night of the
incident, he was great guy and a best friend and all of that stuff It delves in my
opinion of the category of simply trying to distract the jury from the evidence at
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hand and have more focus on who he was as a person rather than what happened
that night.
So if the States [sic] intends on continuing to do those types of things.
J 've got concern, first of all, about the reason for that and the validity behind it

other than to prejudice the jury against my client.
And so if the State indicated they're going to limit the direction to whether
- how he was acting the night at hand and how he was appearing to be under the
influence, that one thing. But if it goes further than that as it did with
Ms. Nylander, we certainly would continue our objection to that.
THE COURT: So as I understand it, you're moving in limine under 401
and 403?
MR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor. If it hasn't any probative value it's
simply more prejudicial than probative, if it has any probative value at all.
(Tr., p.370, L.7 - p.371, L.23 (emphasis added).) It is clear that defense counsel was continuing
his objection from earlier, during Ms. Nylander's testimony, and that his objection was both to
relevance and prejudice. (Tr., p.370, L.7 - p.371, L.23.) The district court recognized the
objection was to both relevance and prejudice.

(Tr., p.371, Ls.18-19.)

The break in jury

proceedings was used both as an opportunity to object to potential future testimony and to clarify
the objection that was made during the earlier bench conference. As such, Mr. Garcia maintains
that his objection to Ms. Nylander's testimony was both to relevancy and prejudice.

3.

Ms. Nylander's Testimony Was Not Admissible Because It Is More Prejudicial
Than Probative

Mr. Garcia asserted that the contested testimony was overly prejudicial.

(App.

Br., pp.11-12.) The State failed to address whether the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, arguing only that Mr. Garcia failed to preserve his
objection. (Resp. Br., pp.24-26.) As such, the State has now waived the opportunity to address
this issue.
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Mr. Garcia relies on the arguments presented in the Appellant's Brief (App. Br., pp.1112.) However, he adds that even in jurisdictions where courts have allowed the admission of
relevant background evidence used to prove the victim was "a living person rather than a simple
statistic," the same courts have found that this same evidence can be overly prejudicial when it
glorifies or enlarges the victim. Richmond, 534 S.W.3d at 233 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).

This danger of prejudice is increased when the evidence is expounded upon by the

prosecution in closing argument. Id.; Com. v. Santiago, 681 N.E.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Mass.
1997). As a result, Mr. Garcia maintains that Ms. Nylander's testimony was unfairly prejudicial
and the error in admitting the evidence was not harmless.

4.

The State Failed To Prove That The Admission Of The Contested Testimony Was
Harmless
a. Ms. Nylander's Testimony Regarding Trying To Have A Child

Under Perry, the test for harmless error is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, there is
no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction.
150 Idaho at 227. The State has asserted that the admittedly erroneous admission of testimony
that Ms. Nylander and Mr. Ruiz Gomez were trying to have children was harmless. (Resp.
Br., p.27.) However, the State did not cite the proper harmless error standard and made no
specific argument that the error did not contribute to the conviction.

(Resp. Br., p.27.)

Therefore, they have waived the opportunity to make a proper harmless error argument on this
issue.
Instead, the State argued that the comment was fleeting, did not bear on a contested issue,
and the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt. Each of these arguments fails. First,
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for the sake of argument only, Mr. Garcia's assertion that there was not overwhelming evidence
of guilt can be found in section I(A)(3)(b) above and is incorporated herein by reference.
Next, while Ms. Nylander' s comment was limited in length, it carried a significant
emotional weight. It invited the jury to consider the ramifications of the death of Mr. Ruiz
Gomez on his family. This is tantamount to improper victim impact evidence. Such evidence is
excluded from trials because of the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Broughton, 450
N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1990); Com. v. Rock, 710 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1999); Miller-El v. State, 782
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Taylor v. State, 592 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 2003); People v.
Barlow, 544 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. 1989); People v. Gillman, 414 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. 1980); Brown v.
State, 757 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Schreibvogel v. State, 228 P.3d 874 (Wyo.

2010); Rainly v. State, 705 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. 2010). Mr. Garcia maintains that although this
comment was brief in comparison to the scope of the entire trial, it was highly prejudicial and
likely had a continuing impact on the jury.
Further, while the comment was not directly related to the issue of whether Mr. Garcia
caused Mr. Ruiz Gomez' injuries, it may have played a role in the jury's feelings about Mr. Ruiz
Gomez and extracted sympathy for his death. A jury that is sympathetic towards the deceased
would be more likely to believe that Mr. Garcia's actions amounted to murder, rather to a killing
in self-defense.

Therefore, the testimony was, at least indirectly, to the jury's ultimate

determination of the only contested issue in the case.
Consequently, the State has failed to prove that the erroneous admission of
Ms. Nylander's testimony regarding trying for children was harmless.
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b.

The Remainder Of Ms. Nylander's Contested Testimony

The State has also asserted that any error in admitting the remaining, contested evidence
was also harmless because the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt, the "biographical
information 'had no prejudicial content,"' Mr. Garcia benefited from the testimony, and the
testimony was proper I.R.E. 404(a)(2) evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.28-29.) Again, each of these
arguments fails. First, for the sake of argument only, Mr. Garcia's assertion that there was not
overwhelming evidence of guilt can be found in I(A)(3)(b) above and is incorporated herein by
reference.
Next, the State claims that the "bare biographical information about Gomez, such as
where he went to school, his age, and his occupation had [no] effect" on the jury.

(Resp.

Br., p.28.) Mr. Garcia agrees. That is why he did not object to any of this information or raise
the presentation of this information as an issue on appeal. Instead, he asserted that the noninnocuous testimony-"[Daviel] was the most amazing person you'll ever meet in your life";
was "very kind"; always willing to help people; "was very, very hard working"; worked 60 hours
a week; "took care of [Ms. Nylander] like no one ever did"; enjoyed going on hikes and to the
gym; and was involved in the community-was inadmissible, overly prejudicial, and not
harmless. The State's argument fails to address this contested testimony.
Further, Mr. Garcia did not "benefit" from Ms. Nylander's testimony about Mr. Ruiz
Garcia's being physically active as that testimony did not show that Mr. Ruiz Garcia was any
more capable of starting or playing a role in a bar fight. It merely showed that he participated in
rather mundane fitness related activities and is too dissimilar from the events at issue to be
relevant to Mr. Garcia's self-defense claim.
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Finally, the State claims that "[a]ny error in admitting Nylander's testimony about
Gomez's traits for peacefulness was also harmless."

(Resp. Br., pp.28-29.)

Mr. Garcia

maintains that the contested testimony did not relate to any "traits for peacefulness," as
articulated in I(B)(l) above. Because I.R.E. 404(a)(2) does not apply to the contested evidence,
it cannot provide a vehicle for the admission of the testimony.
The State failed to prove that there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of the
contested portions of Ms. Nylander's testimony contributed to the verdict and, as such, failed to
prove harmless error.

II.
The State Violated Mr. Garcia's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct
Mr. Garcia asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which requires
the vacation of his conviction. During closing argument, defense counsel objected when the
State referenced testimony admitted for the limited purpose of proving that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was
a human being for the purposes of appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the
jury. The State has misconstrued Mr. Garcia's argument by erroneously asserting that he argued
that the State has a duty to "remind" the jury to which element the admitted evidence pertains
and that his "novel theory that discussing admitted evidence at trial becomes prosecutorial
misconduct if the prosecutor has the subjective intent" of committing misconduct is not
supported by authority. (Resp. Br., p.31.)
Mr. Garcia did not assert that the State had any duty to specifically remind the jury about
the applicability of any piece of evidence to an element. Instead, he argued that State's Exhibits
1 and 2 and the relevant testimony of Ms. Nylander were admitted for a limited purpose and that
presenting closing argument designed to encourage the jury to use the evidence for a purpose
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other than for its admitted purpose, is misconduct. (App. Br., pp.16-17.) Violation of a district
court order governing the presentation of evidence may constitute misconduct. State v. Field,
144 Idaho 559, 572 (2007).
For example, I.R.E 404(b) evidence may be admitted for the purpose of proving identity.
However, it cannot be considered for the purpose of proving propensity. The State’s closing
argument discussion about the identity evidence, articulating that the evidence proved identity,
would be proper. But, arguing that same evidence for the purposes of proving propensity, would
be improper and would constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The same applies to the case at
hand.
Prior to trial, the district court held that it would allow the photos of Mr. Ruiz Gomez and
noted, “I think that those are reasonable photographs and the State’s entitled to show that the
victim was a human being, which is an element that’s been charged.” (Tr. 4/2/18, p.98, Ls.1823.) After Mr. Nylander’s testimony, the district court upheld its prior rulings and again held
that, “I think the State is entitled to admit a certain amount of evidence that demonstrates that the
victim in this case was a human being and it’s an element of the proof. And other than simply
acknowledging that is true organically, I think that they’re entitled to demonstrate some evidence
of his humanness.” (Tr., p.373, L.24 – p.374, L.5.) Discussing evidence admitted to prove
“humanness” and to merely draw attention to Mr. Ruiz Gomez’ status as a human being would
have been proper.

However, discussing the evidence for the purpose of appealing to the

emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury was improper and amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct. Therefore, the issue is not whether the State had to tie evidence back to an element,
but whether the arguments about the “humanness” evidence were for a proper purpose, i.e., did
the evidence show that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was a human being or was it improperly used to appeal
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to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury. In this case, Mr. Garcia maintains that the
State's closing argument flouted the proper purpose of the evidence.
The contested evidence was admitted to show Mr. Ruiz Gomez' status as a human being.
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, it has been recognized in Idaho for over 100 years that a
prosecutor has a duty to see that a defendant had a fair trial and to avoid presenting evidence to
prejudice the minds of the jury State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _ , 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The
prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id. Instead
of arguing that the admitted evidence showed that Mr. Ruiz Gomez was a human being and his
related "humanness", the prosecutor chose to highlight the evidence in way that insured it did
more than prove the deceased was a human being, but encouraged the jury to evaluate the case in
light of their emotions, passions, and prejudices. The prosecutor argued that Mr. Ruiz Gomez
come from a "loving family"; he was a very hard worker, "sometimes 60 or more hours a week";
"he was friendly, that he was often smiling, that he was helping others"; married his high school
sweetheart; and "enjoyed doing things with his family, ... hiking, [and] running." (Tr., p.1733,
L.23 - p.1735, L.2.) This evidence did not make it more likely that Mr. Garcia had murdered a
human being, but did bolster the State's case by reminding the jury that a person worthy of their
sympathy had been killed.
In finding error and reversing the conviction in a similar circumstance, a Massachusetts
court noted:
The prosecutor has a particular obligation not only to argue the Commonwealth's
case forcefully and aggressively, but also to do so in a way that states the
evidence clearly and fairly and inspires confidence that the verdict was reached
based on the evidence rather than sympathy for the victim and her family. The
prosecutor failed in that latter obligation by his repeated references to the victim's
personal characteristics. Certainly the prosecutor is entitled to tell the jury
something of the person whose life had been lost in order to humanize the
proceedings. In a case such as this where the victim's character and personal
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characteristics are not relevant to any material issue, however, the prosecutor is
under an obligation to refrain from so emphasizing those characteristics that it
risks undermining the rationality and thus the integrity of the jury's verdict.
Santiago, 681 N.E.2d at 1209-10.
Because the prosecutor's statements were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a
guilty verdict based on its emotion, rather than the facts of the case, they were irrelevant and
improper, and their admission violated Mr. Garcia's rights to a fair trial and due process under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Additionally, the prosecutorial misconduct requires

vacation of Mr. Garcia's convictions as the State failed to prove that the misconduct did not
contributed to the verdicts and also, for the sake of argument, because there was no
overwhelming evidence of guilt in his case. See supra I(A)(3)(b).

III.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Garcia's Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Garcia asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the district
court's errors combined amount to cumulative error.

The State has asserted that "[e]ven if

Garcia has shown two or more errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not require reversal
because the [S]tate presented overwhelming evidence of Garcia's guilt." (Resp. Br., pp.33-34.)
Once again, the State has cited an incorrect harmless error standard. As noted previously, an
error is harmless in Idaho when the court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict actually reached by the jury in this case. Perry,
150 Idaho at 227. Mr. Garcia maintains that the State has failed to meet its burden to prove that
the errors in his case did not contribute to his verdicts and also, for the sake of argument,
maintains that there was no overwhelming evidence of guilt in his case. See supra I(A)(3)(b).

24

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Garcia, A Unified
Sentence Of Life, With Twenty-Five Years Fixed, For His Conviction For Second Degree
Murder, Twenty Years, With Six Years Fixed, For His Aggravated Battery Conviction, And
Three Years Fixed, For His Possession Of A Controlled Substance Conviction
Mr. Garcia provides no additional argument on this issue, as the State's assertions were
unremarkable.

V.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Garcia To Pay $162,185.27 In
Restitution
Mr. Garcia challenges the district court's order of restitution requiring him to pay
$162,185.27. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to exercise reason
in adequately considering his current and future inability to pay. The State has asserted that,
when ordering restitution, the court should not consider a defendant's present and future ability
to pay because the I.C. § 19-5304(7) notes that a defendant's "immediate inability to pay'' is not
a valid reason to deny restitution. (Resp. Br., p.39.) The State also claims that Mr. Garcia's
argument that a lengthy term of imprisonment may preclude a defendant from being able to pay
in the future is not properly presented because such an argument has "already [been] rejected" by
the Idaho Court of Appeals. (Resp. Br., pp.39-40.) The State's arguments are misplaced.
First, I.C. § 19-5304(7) states that "[t]he court, in determining whether to order
restitution and the amount of such restitution, shall consider . . . the financial resources,
needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems
appropriate. The immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of
itself, a reason to not order restitution."

While I.C. § 19-5304(7) acknowledges that

"immediate inability to pay" is not a justification for denying restitution, "in and of itself', it
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does not limit a consideration of both current and future ability to pay. In fact, the Statue
specifically requires the court to consider the "financial resources" of a defendant.
I.C. § 19-5304(7).

Further, the Idaho Court of Appeals has specifically held that "[i]n

determining an amount for restitution, a court must consider a defendant's indigency." State v.
Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 398 (Ct. App. 2012). And, that the district court may consider an
indigent defendant's "future ability to pay," such as, for example, the defendant's "business
acumen to earn money for restitution upon his eventual release from prison." State v. Bybee, 115
Idaho 541, 543 (Ct. App. 1989).

As such, contrary to the State's assertions otherwise,

indigency and future ability to pay are proper considerations of the court and can provide a
proper basis for a denial of restitution or a reduction in the restitution ordered in a case.
Next, the State's assertion that Bybee holds that a lengthy period of incarnation cannot be
considered as an impediment to paying restitution in the future is erroneous.

Bybee was

convicted and sentenced for the crime of grand theft. Bybee, 115 Idaho at 542. He was ordered
to pay $1,500,035.00 in restitution and sentenced to an indeterminate fourteen-year term. Id.
The Court of Appeals noted that while Mr. Bybee may be limited in his ability to pay restitution
while incarcerated, he would likely be able to earn money upon his release from prison. Id. at
543. While it was possible that Mr. Bybee might be required to serve up to fourteen years, it was
also possible that he would be released very shortly after beginning his sentence. At the time
Bybee was published, the appellate courts considered "the fixed portion of the sentence [to] be
the defendant's probable term of confinement." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). As
such, it is doubtful that the Court of Appeals found a sentence with no fixed time to be "lengthy."
Further, the Court did not hold a lengthy term of confinement could not be considered in
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determining whether to order restitution, but that it could be considered in determining future
ability to pay. Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543.
Additionally, unlike Mr. Bybee, Mr. Garcia was sentenced to a term of life, with twentyfive years fixed.

(R., pp.591-92.) Also, unlike Mr. Bybee, Mr. Garcia does not have "the

business acumen to earn money for restitution upon his eventual release from prison." Bybee,
115 Idaho at 543. Mr. Garcia is a high school dropout and does not have his GED. (PSI, pp.1011, 522, 914-73.) He will be nearly

when he eligible for parole. (PSI, p.1.) Ifhe is

lucky enough to be granted parole at the earliest opportunity, he will have no savings and will
have been removed from the workforce for over two decades. As such, unlike Mr. Bybee, his
future earning ability is extremely limited both by the length of his confinement and future
employability.
In light the circumstances of his case, Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to either significantly reduce the restitution amount or forgo restitution
entirely.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Garcia respectfully requests that his convictions be vacated and his case remanded
for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it
deems appropriate.

Additionally, he requests that this Court vacate the district court's

restitution order and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2019.

Isl Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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